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It has been shown that negative affect causes attentional narrowing. According to East-
erbrook’s (1959) influential hypothesis this effect is driven by the withdrawal motivation
inherent to negative emotions and might be related to increases in arousal. We investi-
gated whether valence-unspecific increases in physiological arousal, as measured by pupil
dilation, could account for attentional narrowing effects in a cognitive control task. Following
the presentation of a negative, positive, or neutral picture, participants performed a saccade
task with a pro-saccade versus an anti-saccade instruction. The reaction time difference
between pro- and anti-saccades was used to index attentional selectivity, and while pupil
diameter was used as an index of physiological arousal. Pupil dilation was observed for both
negative and positive pictures, which indicates increased physiological arousal. However,
increased attentional selectivity was only observed following negative pictures. Our data
show that motivational intensity effects on attentional narrowing can occur independently
of physiological arousal effects.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to cope with threatening events, organisms often recruit
extra resources. Regarding cognitive resources, there is evidence
that affectively negative stimuli immediately prioritize the per-
ceptual processing (Öhman et al., 2001) and recall (Christian-
son, 1992) of related information at the cost of other processes
(Bocanegra and Zeelenberg, 2009; Pessoa, 2009), and it has been
argued that these effects are mediated by the organism’s current
state of arousal (Schimmack, 2005). According to Easterbrook’s
(1959) influential hypothesis, increased arousal may lead to the
narrowing and focusing of attention, thus facilitating appropriate
subsequent responding and coping behavior.
Although threatening events and stress have been demonstrated
to narrow attention (Cohen, 1980; Chajut and Algom, 2003; Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2010a; for a discussion of opposite effects
in trait anxiety, see Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010), it is not clear
whether these observations are due to non-specific arousal or
the activation of affect-specific emotional/motivational systems
(Bradley, 2000). Even though Easterbrook’s original hypothesis
relates to unpleasant situations only, several authors have sug-
gested that any increase of arousal – e.g., whether induced by
caffeine ingestion or impulsivity traits – may modulate attentional
selectivity (e.g., Anderson, 1990). Along similar lines, increas-
ing motivational intensity has been reported to increase focused
attention irrespective of the motivational system (approach ver-
sus avoidance) involved (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008, 2010a,b;
Harmon-Jones and Gable, 2009). However, whether arousal can
be conceived of as a unitary construct has been questioned (Lacey,
1967; Neiss, 1988, 1990) and it is not entirely clear how moti-
vational intensity and arousal are conceptually related (cf. Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2010b). Accordingly, it remains to be shown
whether the emotional modulation of the selective attention
reflects non-specific arousal that can vary orthogonally to the
valence of the present affective state or whether it is specific to
negative, potentially threatening events.
To index a possible narrowing of the attentional focus we used
a visual anti-saccade task (for a review, see Hutton and Ettinger,
2006). This task is typically used as a measure of cognitive con-
trol, which is closely related to attentional selectivity. That is, the
amount of information that is entering the focus of attention may
be limited by cognitive control exerted at a perceptual or more
central processing level (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Pessoa et al., 2003). Moreover, given that the neural
mechanisms underlying the anti-saccade task are well known and
can easily be studied in monkeys as well (cf. Munoz and Ever-
ling, 2004), we considered this task to be particularly well suited
for studying the neuro-cognitive effects of emotion on attentional
selectivity. As a first step, our study aimed at disentangling the rel-
ative contributions of arousal and affective valence on attentional
control using physiological and behavioral measures of arousal
and focused attention, respectively.
In the anti-saccade task, participants are presented with a
peripheral, emotionally neutral target stimulus that appears with
an abrupt onset on the left or right of the central fixation. Depend-
ing on the instruction, they are to move their eyes either to this
target (pro-saccade condition) or to the opposite side of the display
(anti-saccade condition). The common finding is that saccades are
initiated more slowly and less reliably in the anti-saccade than in
the pro-saccade condition. This cost is commonly attributed to
the automatic tendency to look at novel events, which requires
active inhibition in the anti-saccade condition (Olk and Kingstone,
2003). Because improved attentional control decreases automatic
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capture by the target stimulus (Yantis and Jonides, 1990), reflex-
ive saccades toward the stimulus become suppressed. Thus, we
expected that manipulations improving focused attention reduce
the size of the latency costs, with anti-saccades becoming faster
and pro-saccades becoming slower (cf., Kristjansson, 2007).
Affective states were induced prior to each saccade-task trial
using positive, negative, or neutral pictures from the International
Affective Pictures System (IAPS). Valence and arousal ratings of
these pictures show a quadratic relationship, such that positive and
negative stimuli are typically highly arousing and neutral stimuli
low arousing (Lang et al., 2008). To ascertain that the pictures
induced a physiological response we used pupillometry. Recent
work by Bradley et al. (2008) has validated this approach. In that
study, both negative and positive IAPS pictures were shown to
produce pupil dilation, a response reflecting emotional arousal
which is associated with increased sympathetic nervous activation.
By means of this setup we were able to contrast two competing
hypotheses. If more attentional selectivity in affectively laden cir-
cumstances would be driven by non-specific arousal, the difference
in saccadic reaction time (RT) between anti- and pro-saccades
should be reduced following negative as well as positive arousing
pictures as compared to the non-arousing neutral pictures. Alter-
natively, if more attentional selectivity is specific to threatening
situations, this latency cost should be reduced following negative
stimuli but comparable for positive and neutral stimuli.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eleven students from Leiden University (18–22 years old; two
males; one left-handed) participated for either payment (5 Euros)
or course credits.
MATERIALS
Thirty-two highly arousing negative, 32 neutral, and 32 highly
arousing positive pictures were selected from the IAPS set (Lang
et al., 20081). The stimulus set was almost identical to the one
used by Bradley et al. (2008). Like that study, negative and pos-
itive stimuli could be differentiated on the basis of valence IAPS
ratings, whereas they were matched for arousal IAPS ratings (Lang
et al., 2008, see Table 1). Neutral pictures had low arousal ratings
and intermediate valence ratings. In order to avoid light reflex
confounds we used gray-scaled pictures (cf. Bradley et al., 2008);
brightness and contrast were adjusted to ensure identical mean
luminosity values for all pictures.
TASK
Each trial started as soon as participants had successfully looked
at the central fixation cross for at least 1 s. Then an IAPS stimulus
1The library numbers for the IAPS stimuli used in the present study are: Negative:
2120, 2205, 2520, 2590, 2691, 2730, 2750, 2800, 3015, 3030, 3053, 3100, 3170, 3180,
3181, 3400, 3500, 3530, 3550, 6210, 6211, 6212, 6821, 6834, 6838, 9041, 9250, 9300,
9341, 9405, 9800, 9921. Neutral: 2020, 2190, 2200, 2210, 2214, 2215, 2220, 2221,
2235, 2240, 2270, 2272, 2278, 2383, 2393, 2410, 2441, 2491, 2493, 2514, 2579, 2620,
2749, 2752, 2810, 2850, 2870, 2890, 3210, 5455, 7550, 9210. Positive: 2208, 2250,
2260, 2501, 2560, 2650, 4611, 4617, 4640, 4650, 4653, 4658, 4659, 4689, 5621, 8041,
8080, 8090, 8116, 8120, 8161, 8180, 8200, 8280, 8300, 8320, 8330, 8370, 8380, 8400,
8420, 8465.
Table 1 | Emotion and performance measures as a function of picture




Valence rating 2.4 (0.11) 5.0 (0.11) 7.0 (0.11)
Arousal rating 5.9 (0.16) 3.6 (0.16) 5.5 (0.16)
PHYSIOLOGY
Pupil diameter (mm) 4.25 (0.040) 4.19 (0.026) 4.23 (0.033)
BEHAVIOR
Pro-saccadic RT (ms) 196 (8.3) 185 (7.5) 189 (7.4)
Anti-saccadic RT (ms) 257 (12.7) 260 (10.8) 265 (9.8)
appeared for 500 ms, which was replaced by the fixation cross for a
jittered interval ranging from 1500 to 2500 ms. Following a 200-ms
blank gap (cf. Everling and Fischer, 1998), the target stimulus (also
a cross) appeared for 500 ms 8˚ to the left or right to the screen
center. Then the central fixation cross appeared for another inter-
val (ranging from 1000 to 2500 ms) before the next trial started.
At the beginning of each block an 8-s verbal cue (approximately
5.7˚ × 1.4˚; width × height) indicated whether a pro- (target posi-
tion) or an anti-saccade (mirror position of the target) was to be
made to the next target stimulus. The picture (16˚ × 12˚) and the
black fixation cross (0.8˚ × 0.8˚) were shown on a gray background
with luminosity equal to the mean of the pictures. In rare cases
(0.2% of the time), eye tracker recording problems delayed the trial
presentation (inter-trial intervals > 9 s). Because the interruption
of the ongoing presentation sequence by either delayed presenta-
tion or by the onset of a new block is likely to compromise the
experimental manipulation of the arousal and valence, the first
five trials after such events were excluded.
PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed to attend to the emotional pictures
and to make pro- and anti-saccades to the target as fast and accu-
rate as possible. They were also asked to avoid eye blinks during
picture and target presentation. After informed consent and eye
tracker calibration, subjects practiced with six pro-saccade and
six anti-saccade trials preceded by neutral IAPS pictures and fol-
lowed by accuracy feedback for 1 s. Calibration and/or practice
were repeated in case of eye tracking problems or when the subject
did not follow the instructions. The task consisted of six alternat-
ing pro-saccade and anti-saccade blocks (counterbalanced order),
with two self-paced breaks in between. Each block consisted of
48 trials, and every chosen IAPS picture appeared three times
in randomly chosen trials. Participants were debriefed after the
experiment.
DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
Saccadic behavior and pupil diameter were recorded at 120 Hz
using a Tobii T120 eye tracker, which was integrated into a 17-inch
TFT monitor. Participants were seated at a distance of approxi-
mately 60 cm from the monitor while their head was stabilized
by using a chin rest. Artifacts and blinks as detected by the eye
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tracker were corrected by using a linear interpolation algorithm.
A saccade was considered to begin as soon as the horizontal angle
exceeded 2˚ and speed passed a 30˚/s threshold. For all analyses,
we excluded the following trials: trials including and following
recording-related delays (see above), trials following performance
errors, trials with saccadic RT outliers (<80 or >500 ms), and trials
where no saccades could be detected. Repeated-measures ANOVAs
with the factors picture content (negative, neutral, positive) and
task (pro versus anti) were run on pupil dilation and saccadic
behavior measures. Paired t -tests were used for post hoc tests.
RESULTS
PUPIL DILATION
Following Bradley et al. (2008), pupil dilation to the picture con-
tent was measured after the initial light reflex. Dilation was defined
as the mean pupil diameter in a window from 2 to 2.5 s after pic-
ture onset, using a 200 ms pre-picture baseline. As Table 1 shows,
both negative and positive pictures caused dilation in compari-
son to neutral pictures. Analyses revealed a main effect of picture
content [F(2,20) = 4.74, p < 0.05, MSE = 0.005], independent of
task [F(2,20) = 1.02 n.s., MSE = 0.003]. Replicating Bradley et al.
(2008), planned t -tests confirmed that arousing pictures (pool-
ing the positive and negative condition) increased pupil diameter
[t (10) = 2.49, p < 0.05]. As in that study, there was also a trend for
negative pictures to induce more dilation than positive pictures
[t (10) = 1.822, p = 0.09]. Using neutral pictures as comparison,
separate t -tests indicated a significant dilation for negative pic-
tures [t (10) = 2.487, p = 0.032] and a marginal significant dilation
for positive pictures [t (10) = 1.822, pone-sided = 0.049].
SACCADIC BEHAVIOR
See Table 1 for details. As usually found, correct saccadic
RTs were slower during anti blocks than during pro blocks
[F(1,10) = 77.08, p < 0.001, MSE = 1073.76]. More importantly,
this task effect interacted with picture content [F(2,20 = 3.82,
p < 0.05, MSE = 112.48]. Planned t -test showed that the latency
cost (anti-RT minus pro-RT) was not reduced for arousing pic-
tures (pooling the positive and negative condition) versus neutral
pictures [t (10) = 1.50, p = 0.163]. Instead, the latency cost was
reduced following negative pictures only [t (10) = 2.84, p < 0.02]
in comparison to neutral pictures, but not for positive pictures
[t (10) = 0.21, n.s.]. As Figure 1 illustrates, relative to the neutral
baseline, negative pictures slowed down pro-saccadic RT [11 ms;
t (10) = 3.34, p < 0.01] but did not significantly speed up anti-
saccadic RTs [3 ms; t (10) = 0.71, n.s.], whereas positive pictures
did not make any reliable difference (4 and 5 ms, respectively, all
n.s.).
Task also affected the error rates [F(1,10) = 17.90, p < 0.01,
MSE = 0.025]: subjects committed 18% erroneous saccades in
anti-saccade blocks but only 1.5% in pro-saccade blocks. This
effect did not interact with picture content [F(2,20) = 0.97, n.s.,
MSE = 0.006].
To further test whether arousal might mediate any of these neg-
ative emotion effects we re-ran the analyses of correct saccadic RTs
with strong versus weak pupil dilation as an additional factor. For
this purpose, we categorized the trials following emotional pic-
tures by means of a median split of the corresponding dilation
FIGURE 1 | Correct saccadic reaction times as a function of picture
content and task context.
measures. However, even though we replicated the task effect and
its interaction with picture content, the dilation factor was not
involved in any main effect or interaction (Fs < 1).
DISCUSSION
The aim of our study was to test whether attentional narrowing
is due to general arousal or is selectively triggered by negative
affective events. Although pupil dilation data confirmed that both
negative and positive pictures increased the arousal level – a
finding replicating Bradley et al. (2008) – attentional narrowing
was observed following negative pictures only. This indicates that
attentional narrowing is not caused by emotional arousal per se, at
least as it can be measured by pupil dilation following the pre-
sentation of high-arousing pictures. In other words, increased
emotional arousal may be a necessary condition, but it is not a
sufficient condition for increased attentional selectivity. The same
conclusion is suggested by the lack of impact of pupil dilation in
the combined analysis. Hence, our observations do not provide
any evidence for a role of arousal in driving attentional nar-
rowing. Instead, the attentional focus seems to narrow whenever
individuals are encountering events of negative affective valence.
How may negative affect regulate attentional narrowing?
According to one account, dangerous situations may mobilize
executive functions that protect against interference from disrup-
tion by irrelevant, distracting information (Norman and Shallice,
1986). Neuroimaging studies have suggested that these adjust-
ments in cognitive control are implemented in the prefrontal
cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001), probably via signaling from the
anterior cingulate cortex, a brain region involved in the detec-
tion of demanding and aversive situations (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Shackman et al., 2011). Frontal cortex modulation, in turn, may
modulate saccadic eye movements via the basal ganglia (Munoz
and Everling, 2004). Thus, the reduced latency costs triggered by
the negative pictures may originate from affect-driven modula-
tion of cognitive control. This interpretation also fits earlier work
that has used the anti-saccade task to assess inhibitory control (cf.
Munoz and Everling, 2004). A similar explanation may also apply
to earlier published studies such as effects on Stroop tasks usually
attributed to attentional narrowing (e.g., Callaway, 1959; Agnew
and Agnew, 1963; cf. Wachtel, 1967).
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However, it is important to emphasize that the reduced latency
cost with negative pictures was driven by a slowing of RT dur-
ing the pro-saccade block rather than a speeding of RT during
the anti-saccade blocks. This indicates that processes other than
improved control may also play a role in the affective modulation
of behavior. For example, although it is likely that negative emo-
tions increased control and attentional selectivity, which inhibits
the visuo-motor grasp reflex resulting in delayed pro-saccadic
RTs (Kristjansson, 2007), this effect may have become attenuated
during the anti-saccade blocks. Because a state of high cognitive
control is known to attenuate the effects of negative emotions
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005), it might be that the effects of emo-
tions on cognitive control were less pronounced in situations of
higher task demands. Alternatively, it could be that the possible
speeding of anti-saccades is masked by an overall slowing effect
induced by the negative pictures. Indeed, several studies suggest
that the processing of negative events may compete for perceptual
and/or executive resources, which may slow down performance on
a subsequent task (e.g., Gehring et al., 1993; Notebaert et al., 2009;
Pessoa, 2009; Cohen et al., 2011). It remains an important aim for
future studies to disentangle the role of these bidirectional inter-
actions between emotions, perception, and executive function (cf.
Vuilleumier et al., 2003).
Our study demonstrates for the first time that increased emo-
tional arousal is not a sufficient condition to produce focused
attention: pro-saccadic slowing presumably reflecting attentional
narrowing was observed for negative affect, but not for positive
affect. Consistent with this finding, and in contrast to a com-
mon misinterpretation, Easterbrook’s (1959) original hypothesis
attributed attentional narrowing not to general arousal but to
a drive or motivation to withdraw. Given that positive emo-
tions with approach–motivation have been shown to increase
attentional focus (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008; for a
review, see Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010b), it is an impor-
tant challenge for future research to determine which affective
dimension, other than arousal accurately predicts attentional nar-
rowing induced by positive emotions. In line with very recent
discussions (cf. Friedman and Forster, 2011; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2011), our results imply that it is now time to start research
programs that search for emotional dimensions beyond valence
and arousal that are responsible for tuning one’s attentional
scope.
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